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Abstract
This paper investigates how the production function elasticity of
substitution across different labor types impacts the results of pol-
icy analysis in multiperiod lived agent overlapping generations mod-
els. We critique and investigate the popular structure that simply
assumes that workers with different age, experience or education are
perfectly substitutable in production. This structure is inconsistent
with empirical evidence of production complementarities. We couch
our findings in the context of two types of policy reforms: a social
security reform and a tax reform. These reforms were chosen in part
because of the large interest in them, but also because of their differ-
ing effects on life cycle decisions. We find that ignoring production
complementarity may influence the conclusions of policy analysis.
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1 Introduction
Recent research into dynamic fiscal policy has shown considerable ability
to handle complex overlapping generations models with multiperiod lived
agents who participate in rich economies.1 Most of this work uses model for-
mulations where workers of different age, experience or education are perfect
substitutes in the production of goods. However, this formulation conflicts
with a large empirical literature which finds that skilled and unskilled labor
and more and less experienced workers are complementary in production.2
In this paper, we investigate how modeling assumptions about the elasticity
of substitution across labor types that are made by a researcher can impact
the outcome of policy analysis.3 To investigate this, we use two types of
policy reforms, a social security reform and an income tax reform, to build
intuition for understanding the impact of the production function elasticity of
substitution. These reforms were chosen in part because of the large interest
in them, but also because of their differing effects on life cycle decisions. We
find that ignoring production complementarity can impact the conclusions
1Some of the earliest work on multiperiod lived agent overlapping generations models
was carried out by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) using perfect foresight models. Later
work extended this modeling structure in a number of important ways. Some of the papers
that are most relevant to our policy exercises are the following: I˙mrohorog˘lu, I˙mrohorog˘lu
and Joines, (1995), Huggett (1996), Conesa and Krueger (1999, 2006), Huggett and Ven-
tura (1999), Ventura (1999) and Rojas (2005, 2009), among others.
2Katz and Murphy (1992) found point estimates for the elasticity of substitution be-
tween skilled and unskilled labor of 1.41. Other studies, including Heckman, Lochner, and
Taber (1998a), Krussel et al. (2000) and Blankenau and Cassou (2010) also find estimates
close to this value. The literature estimating production elasticities between young and
old workers is less extensive but work by Murphy and Welch (1992), Card and Lemieux
(2001) and Ottaviano and Peri (2011) find the elasticity of subsitutition between young
and old workers is around 5.
3Our exercise is similar to one carried out by I˙mrohorog˘lu and Kitao (2009) who in-
vestigated how the labor supply elasticity impacted conclusions about the effect of social
security reform. A related exercise by Hansen and I˙mrohorog˘lu (2009) investigates two
mechanisms for acquiring skill. However, that study still uses a single effective labor type
in production with relatively skilled agents simply having more of it.
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of policy analysis.
A few recent papers, such as Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998b), Taber
(2002), Rojas (2005, 2009) and Krueger and Ludwig (2013), have begun to
investigate production functions in which workers with different productivity
are less than perfectly substitutable, but considerable work still needs to
be done. Our paper considers two types of labor input and explores two
foundations for these labor types. One foundation, which we refer to as
the experienced based labor structure, assumes that there are less and more
experienced workers. Agents become experienced workers after participating
in the labor force for a period of time.4 The second foundation posits that
agents are born into a skill class and remain there for the rest of their working
careers. Under this later mechanism, which we refer to as the ability based
labor structure, agents might be naturally endowed with different abilities or
might acquire skills early in life through education.5
We wish to emphasize that this paper does not aim to study in depth
the impact of specific policy reforms, but rather to show how a researcher’s
assumptions about the elasticity of substitution might impact results of a
reform. That said, for the sake of clarity, we do focus on two specific policy
reforms to flesh out the impact that the elasticity of substitution assumption
can have. These policy reforms include, a social security reform and an
income tax reform. The reforms are investigated by including an income tax
and social security system in the baseline model formulation and calibrating
the model under each human capital structure to match the U.S. economy.
Next, each baseline formulation is reformed and each reform is then com-
pared to the baseline by computing positive and normative statistics such
as changes in output and welfare. These changes in the economic statistics
4It is also useful to point out that there are many other life cycle studies, including
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), Hubbard and Judd (1987), I˙mrohorog˘lu, I˙mrohorog˘lu and
Joines (1995) and one of the models in Conesa and Krueger (1999), that model effective
labor as growing over time through a type of experience based structure. In these papers,
experience accumulates through an exogenous age related productivity parameter. More
recently, Peterman (2012), Kapicˇka (2012) and Krueger and Ludwig (2013) study optimal
taxation issues in frameworks where human capital and labor productiviy are endogenously
determined. However, most of these papers, unlike Rojas (2005, 2009) and Krueger and
Ludwig (2013), model more and less skilled labor as perfectly substitutable in production.
5Most of the empirical literature that estimates the elasticity of substitution between
skilled and unskilled labor uses education levels to group individuals into skilled and un-
skilled labor, with skilled labor consisting of individuals with a college degree and unskilled
individuals as having less than a college degree.
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are compared across elasticity values to see how this parameter impacts the
assessment of policy reform.
For our models, we find that production complementarity can be impor-
tant for the results of a social security reform but is not very important
for tax reforms. Both reforms impact the same economic margins and the
ultimate differences arise due to differences in how the two reforms impact
the incentives for providing labor over an agent’s lifetime. Furthermore, a
demand side feedback effect is present and this demand side feedback results
in a large range in the equilibrium effects for the social security reform. In
particular, the demand side effect is connected to the elasticity of substitu-
tion across labor types and the change in the relative supply of each type
of labor after the reform. Therefore production elasticities in the empirical
range might imply quite different equilibrium results than the zero elasticity
value implicitly used in most of the earlier studies.
To understand these results more thoroughly, first consider a reform that
completely eliminates the pension system. After the reform, agents need
to increase their savings to cover their retirement. This induces a large in-
crease in the capital stock which impacts the marginal product of the two
labor types. When human capital is modeled as arising via experience,
agents choose the best life cycle labor profile which takes into account their
transition from less to more experienced labor later in life, and this means
that the results of the changes in labor supply can differ substantially with
different elasticities of labor in production. In particular, the large changes
in the relative labor supply of older workers allow the demand side feedback
effect to enter which makes the results sensitive to the elasticity of substi-
tution between young and old labor in production. When human capital is
modeled as arising via an ability endowment things are different. The social
security reform still requires them to increase their savings to cover their re-
tirement, and this induces a large increase in the capital stock which impacts
the marginal products of the two labor types. However, because agents
spend their entire life in their skill class, the impact on the life cycle labor
profile for both agents are similar which reduces the demand feedback effect,
and the outcome of the policy change is largely the same for all production
elasticities.
On the other hand, when investigating a tax reform that reduces the
degree of progressivity, the modeling structure for human capital does not
produce as varied outcomes. This is in part because the biggest effects on the
labor market arise from the lower marginal tax rates on labor. Although this
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channel produces large increases in both types of labor supplies, it tends to
do it in a relatively balanced way, so there are no large changes in the relative
amounts of the two labor types. Furthermore, the savings channel is smaller
than in the social security reform and this in turn reduces the life cycle labor
effects resulting in a reduced demand effect for both the ability endowment
labor structure and the experience based labor structure. It is true that
the case when human capital is modeled as arising from experience produces
larger changes in the life cycle labor profile than the case where human
capital arises via ability endowment. However, the effects are relatively
small in comparison to the social security reform.
Taken as a whole, this analysis shows that production function elasticities
can have an impact on the results of a policy reform. Furthermore, the results
found here provide insight into how policy reform results may be impacted
in other labor foundation structures. One simple way to put the results
here is to note that if the policy reform has an impact on the ratio of the
two worker types, then the labor elasticity matters because of the demand
side feedback effect. We believe this insight carries over to other labor
foundation structures, such as one where labor arises through an explicitly
modeled education sector. If a policy reform results in a change in the
ratio of the two labor types, then the value of the elasticity of substitution
will have an impact on the quantitative results. Conversely, if the policy
reform does not impact the ratio of the two labor types, then the value of
the elasticity will be negligible. Researchers need to understand how their
elasticity choices can impact their results and should be careful to justify
why a particular assumption is suitable for the study at hand.
To present these results in a clear format, we have organized the paper
as follows. Section 2 presents the models. This section is broken down into
subsections to highlight where the models are the same and where they differ.
Section 3 describes how we calibrated the models. Then, in sections 4 and
5, results of a social security reform and a tax reform are evaluated. Finally,
section 6 discusses insights learned from our analysis and how to use these
insights for thinking about other economic models. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model Economies
The objective of this paper is to investigate the effect that the production
function elasticity of substitution across worker types has on the results of
5
policy analysis. We investigate this elasticity under two different labor foun-
dation structures. To make things clear, we have organized this section into
three subsections. The first subsection describes most of the model details.
The second subsection describes the two different labor foundations under
which the elasticity of substitution is explored. The third subsection then
provides a formal definition of the competitive equilibrium so that all the
details for how the models are put together are clear.
2.1 Basic Set-up
For the most part, the model is a standard general equilibrium life cycle
model in which time is discrete. Because of this standard structure, this
subsection breaks things down into subsections using a familiar format. We
begin by describing the demographic structure, then the consumer sector,
the production sector and the government sector are described in turn.
For our analysis, we focus on the steady state results. Even with this
focus on steady state results, we find it convenient to use a subscript t to
indicate time in the description of the model in order to be clear about the
timing of decisions made by individuals within a generation. Later we will
drop the t notation when the model structure is clear.
2.1.1 Demographics
At each date t = 0, 1, ..., there are J overlapping generations of agents.
This cross section of agents arises because of a continuum of new agents
being born at each period t. The population growth rate is assumed to be
constant and equal to n. In addition, agents live a maximum of J periods,
but face a positive probability of death every period. We denote the survival
probability by ψj = prob(alive at j + 1| alive at j) where the subscript j is
used to indicate the age of an agent. At age J , all surviving agents of that
generation die, which we indicate with ψJ = 0. We let the fraction of agents
of age j be denoted by µj and assume the demographic structure is stable in
the sense that µj is constant over time. Under these assumptions it follows
that µj =
ψj
1+n
µj−1.
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2.1.2 Consumers
At birth agents are endowed with no assets but are endowed with one unit
of time in each period of their life which they allocate to leisure or to labor
supply. They use their labor income to purchase consumption goods or
invest in assets which can be sold at a later date to purchase consumption
goods. Households pay consumption and income taxes and, during their
working lives, they also pay a social security tax. Workers retire at age jr
and receive social security payments for the rest of their lives.
Workers are assumed to be heterogeneous with regard to their labor pro-
ductivity which depends on their type. We will describe the structure for
how a worker’s productivity level is determined below, but for now it is suf-
ficient to recognize that there are two types of workers: type 1 and type 2.
We will distinguish an agent’s type with the notation i, where i = 1, 2. We
will let ηi, indicate the productivity component associated with ability i and
let εj, for j = 1, ..J , denote an age-specific labor productivity. This age
specific productivity component is such that agents beyond the retirement
age jr have εj = 0. Finally, agents of type i will receive at t a wage per
effective unit of labor, wi,t. These assumptions together imply that an agent
of type i and of age j who provides ℓi,j,t units of labor, will receive pre tax
labor income equal to εjηiwi,tℓi,j,t at time t.
At any date, households can be characterized by a state variable (ai,j,t, i, j)
where ai,j,t denotes asset holdings for an agent of type i and age j at time t.
At time t, an (ai,j,t, i, j) agent chooses consumption, labor and assets subject
to budget constraints given by
(1 + τ c,t)ci,j,t + ai,j+1,t+1 = ai,j,t + yi,j,t − T (yi,j,t)
with
yi,j,t =


(1− τ ss,t)εjηiwi,tℓi,j,t + rtai,j,t for j < jr
SSt + rtai,j,t for j ≥ jr
and
0 ≤ ai,j+1,t+1
where ci,j,t, ℓi,j,t and yi,j,t are consumption, labor supply and taxable income
at t for an agent of ability i and age j, τ c,t is the sales tax rate at time t,
rt is the return on assets held between time t and time t + 1, τ ss,t is the
social security payroll tax, SSt is the social security pension and T (yi,j,t) is
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the amount of taxes paid at time t for income level yi,j,t. Households are
assumed to be borrowing constrained.
Given these endowment and income constraints, agents make choices so as
to maximize their preferences for consumption and leisure over their lifetimes
given by
E
[
J∑
j=1
βj−1
(
j∏
ι=1
ψι
)
u (ci,j,t, ℓi,j,t)
]
,
where β is the discount factor. The utility function u (c, ℓ) is assumed to
have a CES functional form,
u (c, ℓ) =
[cγ(1− ℓ)1−γ ]
1−σ
1− σ
, for σ 6= 1,
where 0 ≤ σ and γ measures the relative importance of consumption in
utility. Under this utility function specification, the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is equal to, 1
1−γ(1−σ)
.
2.1.3 Firms
Firms in the economy operate a constant returns to scale production func-
tion which uses capital, Kt, and aggregate labor, Lt, to produce output, Yt
according to
Yt = AK
α
t L
1−α
t ,
where 0 < α < 1 and A > 0. As usual, the parameter α can be interpreted as
representing the share of output used to pay capital owners. We assume that
there is no technological progress and, therefore, total factor productivity A
is constant over time. Also, capital is assumed to depreciate at rate δ.
The aggregate labor input, Lt, is measured in efficiency units and depends
on type 1 labor and type 2 labor according to,
Lt = B
[
λL
1−ρ
1t + (1− λ)L
1−ρ
2t
] 1
1−ρ , for ρ 6= 1,
where 0 ≤ ρ and L1t and L2t denote efficiency units of labor of type 1 and
labor of type 2, respectively. The inverse of the elasticity of substitution
between labor of type 1 and labor of type 2 is equal to ρ. When ρ = 0,
labor of type 1 and labor of type 2 are perfect substitutes. Any value of ρ
larger than zero implies imperfect substitution between both types of labor.
In addition, firms participate in competitive markets so that wage rates and
capital rental rates equal their marginal products in production.
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2.1.4 The government
The government runs what can essentially be regarded as two separate bal-
anced budget accounts.6 First, the government runs a pay as-you-go type
social security system in which retirees obtain social security payments of SSt
equal to bt percent of current average wage income. These payments are fi-
nanced by payroll taxes at rate τ ss,t which are just high enough to balance
the social security budget.
The government also runs a balanced budget in its non social security
budget which we will refer to as the federal budget. It is assumed that
government spending at time t, denoted Gt, is exogenously given. This
spending is financed through income taxes, T (yt), sales taxes, τ c,t, and acci-
dental transfers, Trt, arising from the unanticipated deaths of some agents
of the economy.
We assume a progressive income tax system described by the policy rule
suggested by Gouveia and Strauss (1994) under which taxes depend on tax-
able income, y, as follows,
T (y) = κ0
[
y −
(
y −κ1 + κ2
)− 1
κ1
]
,
where κ0, κ1 and κ2 are parameters. Under this income tax policy rule, both
marginal and average tax rates depend positively on taxable income. When
κ1 is equal to zero, the tax system is purely proportional. As κ1 increases,
the tax system becomes more progressive.
2.2 Labor Foundations: Two Alternative Formulations
The description of the model up to this point applies regardless of the founda-
tions for the two types of labor. In our analysis we explore two foundations
for the labor types. In the first version, which we will refer to as the ability
endowment labor structure, we assume that agents are born as either un-
skilled (type 1) or skilled (type 2). Under this formulation, one may think of
skills as related to education that occurs prior to entry into the labor force.
Agents born into a particular ability class maintain this skill level throughout
their life. We let pi indicate the probability of being born type i = 1, 2.
6Our usage of two different government budgets uses the structure and terminology
used in the U.S. where in principle the Social Security Budget is kept separately from the
Federal Budget.
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The second version, which we will refer to as the experience based la-
bor structure, follows Rojas (2005, 2009) in assuming that some skills are
acquired through work experience. Workers have no experience when they
join the labor market. Workers with less than js years of work experience
are workers of type 1 under this formulation. After js years at work, agents
become experienced workers or workers of type 2. Note that all agents of
each generation are the same.
2.3 The Competitive Equilibrium
From this point on we will focus on stationary equilibria and thus it will be
convenient to drop the time subscripts. Since there is still a small need to
distinguish some variables at different dates, we will use a prime notation to
indicate variables next period. So, for example, under this convention, a
will indicate asset holdings by an agent at the beginning of the period and a′
will indicate asset holdings at the end of the period which will be held until
the next period.
The first thing to note is that the model is transformed in the usual
way by dividing aggregate variables by population size and using lower case
variables to indicate per capita variables.
Definition. Given a demographic structure {µj}
J
j=1 and policies {τ c, G, τ ss},
a steady state equilibrium is a collection of functions for the household
{V (a, i, j), c(a, i, j)
a′(a, i, j), ℓ(a, i, j), y(a, i, j)}, prices {r, w1, w2}, aggregate capital K, aggre-
gate labor, L, efficiency units of labor of type 1, L1, efficiency units of labor
of type 2, L2, social security replacement rate, b, social security pensions,
SS, tax function, T (.), transfers due to accidental bequests, Tr, and a law
of motion for the distribution of agents Φ(a, i, j) such that,
1. Given prices, policies and initial conditions, {V, c, a′, ℓ, y} are such that
V (a, i, j) = max
{c,a′,ℓ}
u(c, ℓ) + βψjEV (a
′, i, j + 1)
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subject to
(1 + τ c)c(a, i, j) + a
′(a, i, j) = a+ y(a, i, j)− T [y(a, i, j)]
y(a, i, j) = (1− τ ss)εjηiwiℓ(a, i, j) + ra for j < jr
y(a, i, j) = SS + ra for j < jr
0 ≤ a′(a, i, j)
c > 0, 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ 1
V (., ., J + 1) = 0
2. Prices are such that the representative firm maximizes profits
r = αAKα−1L1−α − δ,
w1 = (1− α)AK
αL−α
∂L
∂L1
= (1− α)λAKαL
−αρ
1−ρL
−ρ
1 ,
w2 = (1− α)AK
αL−α
∂L
∂L2
= (1− α)(1− λ)AKαL
−αρ
1−ρL
−ρ
2 ,
with
L = B
[
λL
1−ρ
1 + (1− λ)L
1−ρ
2
] 1
1−ρ
3. The social security tax and pension are such that,
SS = b
w1L1 + w2L2
jr−1∑
j=1
µj
,
τ ss (w1L1 + w2L2) = SS
J∑
j=jr
µj ,
4. Transfers are equal to accidental bequests,
Tr =
∑
i,j
(1− ψj)a
′(a, i, j)Φ(a, i, j)
1 + n
5. The government budget constraint holds
G =
∑
i,j
T [y(a, i, j)] Φ(a, i, j) + τ c,t
∑
i,j
c(a, i, j)Φ(a, i, j) + (1 + r)Tr,
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6. All markets clear,
- Goods market:∑
i,j
c(a, i, j)Φ(a, i, j)+
∑
i,j
a′(a, i, j)Φ(a, i, j)+G = AKαL1−α+(1−δ)K
- Capital market:
K =
∑
i,j
a′(a, i, j)Φ(a, i, j)
1 + n
- Labor market: in the ability endowment labor structure
L1 =
jr−1∑
j=1
εjη1ℓ(a, 1, j)Φ(a, 1, j)
L2 =
jr−1∑
j=1
εjη2ℓ(a, 2, j)Φ(a, 2, j)
or, in the experience based labor structure
L1 =
js∑
j=1
εjη1ℓ(a, 1, j)Φ(a, 1, j)
L2 =
jr−1∑
j=js+1
εjη2ℓ(a, 2, j)Φ(a, 2, j)
7. The distribution Φ(a, i, j) is such that,
- in the ability endowment labor structure
For newborn agents, Φ(a, i, 1) =
{
piµ1 if a = 0
0 otherwise
For j > 1, Φ(a′, i, j+1) =
{
ψjΦ(a, i, j) if a
′ = a′(a, i, j)
0 otherwise
- in the experience based labor structure
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For newborn agents, Φ(a, i, 1) =
{
µ1 if a = 0 and i = 1
0 otherwise
For 1 < j < js or j > js, Φ(a
′, i, j+1) =
{
ψjΦ(a, i, j) if a
′ = a′(a, i, j)
0 otherwise
For j = js, Φ(a
′, 2, j+1) =
{
ψjΦ(a, 1, j) if a
′ = a′(a, 1, j)
0 otherwise
3 Calibration
To understand the calibration procedure it is important to be clear about
the objective of this paper. The objective is not to comment in depth about
the impact of policy, but rather to comment about how a researcher’s as-
sumptions about the elasticity of substitution across labor types may impact
their analysis of policy.
Because we conduct this analysis using two different labor foundations
which have different parameters, the calibration exercise has to be suitably
controlled as well. What we do, is to calibrate each model so that they
match the same statistics. In effect, we are trying to mimic a situation
where different researchers may each have their own model for the economy,
but they agree on what statistics should be matched when calibrating their
models.
For each version of the model, we calibrate a benchmark formulation that
matches the U.S. economy in which there is a progressive income tax system
and a pay-as-you-go social security system. We also calibrate the benchmark
economy under different production elasticities across labor types.
We use a typical calibration strategy which picks some parameters from
a set of values that are widely used in the macroeconomic literature, and we
pick other parameters by ensuring that the model matches some “stylized
facts” from the observed data. The parameter selection process works as
follows.
Demographics. Agents in our economy are born when they are 20 (j = 1),
and live at most until 100 (J = 81). The survival probabilities, ψj , are
taken from the United States life tables in 2003 using the data for the total
population. Agents retire at 65 years old (j = 46). The population growth
rate is set equal to 1.1% which matches the long run U.S. population growth
rate.
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Preferences. The discount rate, β, is set in order for the capital-to-output
ratio to be 3.0 in the benchmark model economy as it is observed in the U.S.
data. The weight for consumption in the utility function, γ, is calibrated so
that on average, the portion of the time endowment devoted to work is 0.33.
Parameter σ is set equal to 2 which implies that the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is equal to 0.75 and the average Frisch elasticity 1.4.
Technology. As is common in macroeconomic calibrations, α is set to 0.36,
which matches the long run participation of capital income in Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) for the U.S. The depreciation rate, δ, is chosen in order for
the benchmark model economy to result in an investment share in GDP equal
to 0.28, as observed in the U.S. economy and the total factor productivity
parameter, A, is set equal to one.
Government. The government spending parameter, g, is set to 0.17, which
is the percentage of total output consumed by the government in the U.S.
economy. The consumption tax rate, τ c, is set equal to 0.052, following
Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994). The parameters κ0 and κ1 in the income
tax policy rule, T (.), are fixed to values found by Gouveia and Strauss (1994),
while κ2 is then set so that there is a balanced public budget. Finally, the
social security payroll tax is set equal to 10.6%, which matches the U.S.
percentage once deducted the disability insurance portion. This implies a
replacement rate, b, equal to 42%.
Labor type and labor productivity. The age-specific productivity com-
ponent, εj, is calibrated using values estimated in Hansen (1983) for male
workers. The parameters related to the labor type are then assigned values
that differ based on the model version.
In the ability endowment labor structure, p1 is chosen to be equal to the
percentage of the U.S. population with less than a college degree, according
to Current Population Survey (CPS) data. The productivity component
associated with skill levels, η1 and η2, are set following Storesletten, Telmer
and Yaron (2004) to calibrate the model economy so that the variance of the
logarithm of earnings for 20 year olds is equal to 0.27.
In the experience based labor structure, it is assumed that agents become
experienced workers after 15 years of work experience (js = 15) and the
productivity component associated with labor types, η1 and η2, were both
set equal to one. The reason for the later calibration is that differences in
productivity that depend on age are already captured by εj .
We follow Rojas (2005) to calibrate parameters ρ, B and λ in the pro-
duction function. We consider a range of values for ρ between 0 and 4. This
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range of values is consistent with the range of values found in both the labor
literature that focuses on the elasticity of substitution between skilled labor
and unskilled labor, as well as the literature that focuses on the elasticity of
substitution between experienced and inexperienced workers.7 When ρ = 0,
workers of type 1 and workers of type 2 are perfect substitutes and their
differences in productivity are already captured by the estimated values for
εj and the calibrated values of ηi. Therefore, we set λ = 0.5, and we have
w1 = w2. We scale the economy size by setting B = 2. This calibration of the
benchmark economy then becomes the target for other parameterizations of
λ and B under different values of ρ. For each ρ, we recalibrate λ and B so as
to have exactly the same benchmark economy as in the case with ρ = 0. In
other words, the benchmark economy will be numerically the same for all the
cases assuming different degrees of complementarity between labor of type 1
and labor of type 2. Therefore, potential differences in the impact of a policy
reform will necessarily be due to the strategy adopted by the researcher to
model labor complementarity.
Tables 1a and 1b summarize the outcome of the calibration procedure
for all the models. Table 1a is divided into three panels. The first panel
provides information about the common calibration details while the next
two panels provide information about parameters that are specific to the two
versions of the model. Table 1b then provides further parameters which
reflect different production function formulations ranging from a perfectly
substitutable case to one in which the elasticity of substitution is at the high
end of the empirical range. Table 1b is also broken into two panels with
each panel representing parameter values associated with a different version
of the model.
[INSERT TABLE 1a AND TABLE 1B HERE]
4 Social Security Reform Results
In this section we evaluate a social security reform policy under the different
formulations for the model to see how sensitive the results are to the elas-
ticity of substitution values. The social security reform we consider is one
7The skilled and unskilled labor elasticity literature includes Katz and Murphy (1992),
Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998a), Krussel et al. (2000) and Blankenau and Cassou
(2010) while the experienced and inexperienced labor elasticity literature includes Murphy
and Welch (1992) Card and Lemieux (2001) and Ottaviano and Peri (2011).
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that has been explored by Conesa and Krueger (1999), Fuster, I˙mrohorog˘lu
and I˙mrohorog˘lu (2007), I˙mrohorog˘lu and Kitao (2009), Rojas (2009) and
others, and consists of eliminating the social security system. Although
other types of reform are worth considering in the right setting, we do not
look at them here because the objective of this paper is not to make state-
ments about policy reforms, but instead, to make statements about how the
analysis of reforms can be impacted by the production function elasticity
of substitution. Furthermore, although it is feasible to investigate transi-
tional dynamics between baseline policies and post reform policies, we do
not do this for the same reason. In what follows, we describe the pre and
post reform steady states for the model and explain how the model structure
impacts the outcome of a reform.
Table 2 and Figures 1a and 1b summarize some of the key results for
evaluating the impact modeling assumptions have on social security reform
analysis.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Table 2 is broken into two panels, with the upper panel focusing on the
ability endowment labor structure and the lower panel focusing on the ex-
perience based labor structure. The first column of each panel presents the
value that output, the capital to output ratio, the type 1 labor input, the
type 2 labor input, average hours worked, interest rate and wage rate take
in the benchmark economy. Columns 2 to 6 provide results of the post re-
form steady state for different values of the production elasticity. For each
variable, except the interest rate, we report the percentage difference from
the pre reform, or baseline, steady state. For the interest rate we report
levels before and after the reform. So for instance, looking across the first
row, we see that for the ability endowment labor structure model, the output
level is 0.76 in the benchmark economy, while under perfectly substitutable
labor inputs (ρ = 0), the post reform output is 25.0% higher than in the
baseline model. The last row presents the consumption equivalent variation
(CEV). For the economy in column one, the CEV is 7.3%, which means that
this policy results in a utility increase that would be equivalent to a 7.3%
increase in consumption from the pre policy change value.
To begin the analysis, let us start by intuitively recognizing how a social
security reform impacts the economic variables. Elimination of the social
security system does two direct things. It increases consumer disposable
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income because of the elimination of the social security tax and it requires
that consumers accumulate their own portfolio of assets to cover their retire-
ment. Taken together, these direct effects imply that most of the increased
disposable income is plowed into savings and this increased savings conse-
quently increases the capital stock. The higher capital stock then results
in two effects for the labor supply. First, the higher capital stock increases
the marginal products of both labor types and this accounts for the mostly
larger labor values reported in Table 2. Second, the higher capital stock
reduces the returns to savings and this lower return to savings produces an
intertemporal labor reallocation effect which makes agents desire working
later in life and spending more of their time at leisure in their younger years.
Furthermore, the extent to which labor is reallocated to youth depends on
the demand side of the labor market and, moreover, this demand side effect
depends on the labor input modeling structure. As we show below, in cases
in which labor types are relatively substitutable in production, the demand
side of the labor market produces no offsetting effects from consumers who
wish to work less when young. However, when labor types are relatively
complementary in production, the demand side of the labor market produces
effects which offset consumer desires. This offsetting effect has large impli-
cations in the experience based labor structure and this accounts for the very
different implications for that model when labor types are complementary in
production.
To see how these economic effects work, begin by looking at Table 2,
and noting that the range for the output changes is from 25% to almost
30%. These output gains arise from the increase in the capital stock and
(in most cases) the increase in the labor inputs which we will explain in a
moment. The second thing to notice is that the production elasticity of
substitution is not important to the outcome of the ability endowment labor
structure models. In all of these cases, the output gain is 25%. However,
the production elasticity of substitution is important for the experience based
labor structure model. For this model, when the labor inputs are perfectly
substitutable (ρ = 0), the output increase is on the low end, with a gain of
25.5%, while when the labor inputs are relatively complementary (ρ = 4),
the output gain is on the high end, with a gain of 29.8%.
Moving on to the capital to output ratio row, we see that capital exhibits
a similar pattern as output. Again, these magnitudes are consistent with
other studies that consider similar theoretical frameworks and calibration
targets. Since the numerator is the capital stock in these ratios, the fact
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that these percentage changes are positive indicates that capital expands
somewhat more than output. This is not surprising because that input is
impacted most directly by eliminating the social security system. Without
social security, agents need to save for themselves for retirement and savings
can only be accomplished through capital accumulation.
The impact of the production function elasticities on labor supply is quite
different for the two labor foundations and arises because of the complicated
cross effects on the labor market. As the table shows, under the ability
endowment labor structure, the production elasticity of substitution results
in very small effects on the labor supply and thus on output, while in the
experience based labor structure, the production elasticity results in larger
effects on the labor supply and thus on output.
To understand how these differences arise, let us work through the eco-
nomics of the labor market in more detail. First recall that the effect of the
higher need to save and the higher capital stock, is a lower return on capital
and thus savings. This lower capital return then makes it less attractive
for agents to work during their youth and then sit on their assets and let
the interest income compound to build a portfolio for retirement. Instead,
households react to the reform by substituting intertemporally labor supply
so that agents want to use more of their time allocation early in life for leisure
and devote more of their time allocation to work later in life. Next, consider
how the labor structure plays into the desire to take more leisure when young
and work more when old. The key to understanding the differences between
the two structures originates from the demand side for labor. It can be
shown that the wage ratio for labor of type 1 and labor of type 2 is given by
w1
w2
=
λ
1− λ
(
L1
L2
)−ρ
.
This equation implies that changes in the labor ratio induces changes in the
relative wages. In particular, when ρ > 0, a decline in L1
L2
results in an
increase in w1
w2
, and this demand effect can work against the supply effect
induced by the low returns to savings.
Working through these labor market effects for the ability based labor
structure, we will now argue that the demand side effect is negligible and
this accounts for the similar equilibrium values under the different produc-
tion elasticities. To understand why the demand side effect is negligible,
one needs to actually start on the supply side. According to the modeling
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assumptions, both labor types experience the same life cycle productivity
patterns which are summarized by Hansen (1983) and modeled by εj and
this is the one feature that dominates the intertemporal decisions. Other
differences between the two labor types include the skill type productivity
component ηi, which is calibrated so that skilled workers have more effec-
tive labor units at each date than unskilled workers, the wage rates received
per effective labor unit wi and the progressivity of the tax system. Taken
together, these differences imply that the two skill types have life cycle af-
ter tax labor income profiles that are close to perfect scalars of each other.
This means that the intertemporal trade-offs arising from the low returns to
capital faced by the two agent types are largely the same and both respond
to the reform in the same way, resulting in L1
L2
staying fairly constant. This
relatively constant L1
L2
then implies that relative wages are relatively constant
no matter what the value for the production elasticity and this neutralizes
the demand effect.
[INSERT FIGURE 1a HERE]
Both the similar intertemporal time allocation profiles between the two
labor types and the lack of an effect from the production elasticity can be
seen in Figure 1a which graphs the life cycle labor supply for the baseline
economy and the two extreme post reform elasticity cases (ρ = 0 and ρ = 4).
Figure 1a consists of a pair of diagrams, with the first diagram representing
the life-cycle labor supply for unskilled workers and the second diagram rep-
resenting the life-cycle labor supply for skilled workers. In these plots we use
a convention of plotting the baseline economy using a long dash, the perfectly
substitutable labor inputs in production case (ρ = 0) using a short dash, and
the relatively complementary labor inputs in production case (ρ = 4) using a
solid line. One common feature of all the labor profiles is a flat, or constant,
labor supply for the first few years of an agents working career. This arises
because agents are constrained from borrowing. The date when the labor
supply starts to increase occurs when the nonnegativity constraint on assets
stops binding. To finance positive savings, agents increase their work effort.8
Figure 1a shows the post reform intertemporal substitution of hours
worked, where agents tend to work less when young and more when old,
8This feature was also seen in other papers such as Conesa and Krueger (1999).
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for both agent types.9 Note also that the life-cycle labor supply profile is
flatter after the reform because agents have to work considerably more over
their working lives in order to accumulate their retirement portfolio. Further
note, that both agent types have largely the same post reform intertemporal
labor profile and this is what neutralizes the demand effect linked to the
elasticity of substitution in production.
On the other hand, quite different labor outcomes arise in the experience
based labor structure economies. This can be seen in both Table 2, which
provides the aggregated less and more experienced labor inputs at each date,
and Figure 1b, which provides the intertemporal labor provision for agents
under different production elasticities. As Table 2 shows, the steady state
post reform aggregate old (more experienced) labor input increases by be-
tween 15.3% and 21.5%, depending on the production elasticity, while the
young (less experienced) labor input exhibits a more varied outcome, with
input changes ranging between -3.5% and 7.0%. Figure 1b plots the labor
inputs over the agent’s life-cycle for the baseline economy and two post re-
form economies including the perfectly substitutable case (ρ = 0) and the
relatively complementary case (ρ = 4). In this figure, we have used the same
plotting convention as in Figure 1a. One obvious difference between the two
figures is that only one diagram is needed to plot the life-cycle labor supply
because there is only one agent who transitions from labor of type 1 to labor
of type 2 midway, at age 35, through their working career. Thus the portion
of the life-cycle labor supply curves for ages less than 35 corresponds to the
less experienced labor supply while the portion of the curves for ages greater
or equal to 35 correspond to the more experienced labor supply.
[INSERT FIGURE 1b HERE]
To understand the economics in the experience based labor structure
economy, again recognize that the higher savings rate, increases the capital
stock, which reduces capital returns and makes agents prefer to work less
when young and more when old. However, in the experience based labor
9McGrattan and Rogerson (2004) describe the lifetime pattern of hours worked per
person in the US since World War II and find evidence of shifts from older people to
younger people. They point out that a relevant factor for this lifecycle reallocation has
been increases in social security benefits to retired workers. The reaction of hours worked
that we find in our simulations of the social security reform are consistent with that
evidence.
20
structure economy, the demand side margin also comes into play for the in-
tertemporal labor choice. The demand margin enters because agents are
workers of type 1 when young and workers of type 2 when old. This means
their labor income profile changes dramatically over their lifetimes and they
will take this into account in choosing their life cycle labor profile. Now
because agents supply less experienced labor when young and more experi-
enced labor when old, changes in the life cycle labor profile create changes in
L1
L2
which alters the relative wages and creates a demand effect which offsets
the consumer’s supply effect. Furthermore, this demand effect varies with
the production elasticity of substitution, so that the entire equilibrium is
impacted by this elasticity.
When more and less experienced workers are perfect substitutes (ρ = 0),
relative wages do not change with the relative supply of less experienced
workers. This means there is no demand effect from the production elastic-
ity and the capital induced intertemporal labor reallocation approximately
matches what occurs in the ability endowment labor structure. This can be
seen in the ρ = 0 plot in Figure 1b. On the other hand, when ρ is positive,
the pressure from the labor supply side to reduce time in production of less
experienced workers, is partially offset by pressure from the labor demand
side to keep balanced amounts of both types of labor inputs. In this case
less experienced labor wage rates rise, which encourages more young labor.
For large values of ρ, effects due to labor input complementarity more than
offset the labor supply pressure and the general equilibrium effect results
in an increase in less experienced labor hours. The ρ = 4 plot in Figure
1b exhibits these competing effects on the intertemporal labor profile. In
particular, the high degree of complementarity between the two labor inputs
encourages a larger young labor component than lower values of ρ. How-
ever, the low capital return effect, still produces a time preference for lower
labor supply early in life. This effects manifests itself so that focusing only
at on one type of labor, we see a skewness so that the bulk of that labor
type comes later in the agent’s lifetime. So in particular, the agent provides
considerable more inexperienced labor when they are in their 30s as opposed
to when they are in their 20s and they provide more (relative to the perfectly
elastic case) experienced labor when they are in their 60s than when they
are in their 40s.
To summarize our results, we have shown that the structure for modeling
labor types complementary impacts the results of a social security reform.
When agents are born into their ability type, the main effect on labor alloca-
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tions arises from the low returns on capital which produces an intertemporal
preference for providing labor later in life. On the other hand, when agents
transition from less experienced labor to more experienced labor, a second
effect has a significant impact on the equilibrium labor profile. This second
effect comes from the demand side of the labor market. When production
has labor elasticities that are relatively complementary, then the reduced
desire for providing labor early in life is offset by higher wages for less ex-
perienced labor. This production effect can result in quite dramatic swings
in an agent’s intertemporal labor profile. Furthermore, these large effects on
the labor supply are consistent with Rojas (2009) and result in large effects
on the entire equilibrium outcome.
5 Tax Reform Results
In this section we investigate the impact of assumptions about the elasticity of
substitution across labor types on the results of a tax reform. The particular
tax reform we consider consists of a revenue neutral reform of the tax system
from the baseline progressive tax system used in the calibration to a pure
proportional tax system. Numerous studies, including Castan˜eda, Dı´az-
Gime´nez, and Rı´os-Rull (1999), Ventura (1999), Cassou and Lansing (2004)
and Conesa and Krueger (2006), have investigated this type of reform. There
are many alternative tax reforms one could consider, but our main objective
is to investigate how assumptions about the production function elasticity
of substitution can impact the results of policy analysis, and it is not to
undertake a comprehensive policy analysis, so we only consider this one type
of tax reform. Also, as before, we find that it is sufficient to understand
the impact of modeling assumptions on policy by simply comparing steady
states, so again we ignore the transition path between steady states.
Table 3 and Figures 2a and 2b present some of the results for the tax re-
form under the different model formulations using the same reporting format
as was used for the social security analysis. The tax reform is modestly more
complicated than the social security reform in that it not only has a similar
equilibrium effect that works through the savings channel as in the social
security reform, but it also has a direct effect on labor supply because of the
lower marginal tax rates. This direct effect on labor supply produces the
largest impact on the equilibrium, resulting in a net increase in the life cycle
labor input profiles for all agent types in both labor modeling structures.
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This can be seen in Figures 2a and 2b by the upward shift in the equilib-
rium labor values across the agents’ entire working career. The second effect
works through the savings channel as in the social security reform and has a
much smaller impact.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
To understand these effects more completely, first note that the tax reform
reduces marginal tax rates and these lower marginal taxes are particularly
beneficial to wealthier households who, in our model, have larger labor pro-
ductivity. These lower marginal tax rates increase the desire to work which
increases income and savings. As in the social security reform, the higher sav-
ings rate results in higher capital stocks, and consequently, higher marginal
products of labor which encourage even greater equilibrium labor than the
change in marginal tax rates would have alone. Furthermore, these increases
in the capital and labor inputs have a secondary tax benefit in that they re-
sult in higher tax revenues and allow the government to raise funds required
to finance public spending by setting even lower tax rates
[INSERT FIGURE 2a HERE]
As in the social security reform, the trickiest equilibrium effects occur in
the labor market where all the supply and demand effects discussed before
are present as well as a new incentive to work due to the lower tax rates.
However, unlike the social security reform, the only labor market effect of
any significance is the direct effect of the reduced tax rates on wages. Here
the lower tax rates and the larger labor productivity due to higher capital
accumulation, increase after-tax wages and labor supply in all the periods of
the agent’s working life. This can be seen in both Figures 2a and 2b.
Next consider the intertemporal substitution effect for the labor supplies.
Interestingly, in the tax reform, there are two things which work to produce
the intertemporal substitution for the labor supply, one of which was not
present in the social security reform. The first source is the same one as in
the social security reform and works through savings. In the tax reform, al-
though the return on capital does fall because of the higher capital stock, the
tax rate on capital returns is also reduced and thus the net effect on returns
to savings are small. The second source for the intertemporal substitution
for the labor supply arises because older workers’ productivity is larger and
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they benefit more from the tax cut than younger workers. However, as shown
in Figures 2a and 2b, the resulting intertemporal substitution effect for the
labor supply, which was so important in the social security reform, is hardly
detectable in the tax reform.
As in the social security case, the impact of the tax reform on equilibrium
hours worked is the result of the interplay between the labor supply effect
that we have just described and the labor demand effect. To understand the
labor demand side effect, recall in the social security reform that the demand
side effect arose because of changes in the L1
L2
ratio which changed the wage
ratio between the two labor types and resulted in a feedback effect on the
equilibrium. As in that reform, the ability endowment based labor structure
economy implies similar life cycle changes to the after tax wage rates between
the two skill types, resulting in similar changes to both unskilled and skilled
labor, thus keeping the L1
L2
ratio approximately the same and muting the
demand effect. This muted demand effect shows up in Table 3 where the
tax reform shows little differences between the different ρ values under the
ability based labor structure.
In the experience based labor structure economy, there are larger demand
effects, but they do not approach the size of those found in the social security
reform. Here, the intertemporal labor substitution effect results in changes in
L1
L2
and thus results in the demand effect working through wages. The impact
of the change in L1
L2
can be seen in Figure 2b, where as in Figure 1b, there is
a jump down in the ρ = 4 case right at the date when agents transition from
less experienced to more experienced labor. On the other hand, as in the
social security reform, when young and old workers are perfect substitutes,
that is ρ = 0, relative wages do not change with L1
L2
and the demand effect
is negligible. Although the production elasticity of substitution will have
some role, both Table 3 and Figure 2b show only small differences across the
different values of ρ illustrating this small demand effect.
[INSERT FIGURE 2b HERE]
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6 Insights for other policy reforms and other
modeling environments
While our results are for two specific policy reforms and two specific modeling
environments, the insights can be applied in other settings. In this section
we offer a few speculations as to how these results provide insight into other
modeling scenarios.
As emphasized in our discussion, one condition for the production func-
tion elasticity of substitution between the two labor types to be important
is for the policy reform to result in changes in the ratio of the two types of
labor inputs. It was noted for instance, in the tax reform analysis using
either labor modeling structure, the two labor types where impacted in rela-
tively equal ways, so the ratio did not change much and thus the production
function elasticity of substitution had a small effect on the results. How-
ever, in the social security reform with the experience based labor structure,
the reform resulted in a relatively large change in the ratio of the two labor
types and thus the value of the elasticity of substitution became important.
This ratio insight is likely to be useful in other settings. So for instance,
in a model where human capital is acquired through schooling and policy
reforms are undertaken to encourage greater numbers of college graduates,
which are typically considered skilled workers, then the elasticity assumption
is going to be important for the results. Similarly, in a model which may
look in most ways like the ability endowment structure above, but adds the
realistic feature, that skilled worker productivities grow more steadily over
an agent’s lifetime than unskilled workers, then policies which impact the
rate of growth of the worker productivities or the life cycle labor profiles
differently for the two skill types are likely to have an impact on the ratio of
skilled to unskilled works and thus imply that assumptions on the elasticity
of substitution between the worker types will have an impact on the results.
Another modeling assumption that may impact one’s results is the labor
supply elasticity. Our model assumes a popular structure used in numerous
macroeconomic papers, which implies that the Frisch labor supply elasticity
changes over time when an agent’s supply of labor changes. Some stud-
ies, such as I˙mrohorog˘lu and Kitao (2009) and Peterman (2013) have shown
that assumptions about the Frisch labor supply elasticity can also impact
the results of ones analysis. In some separate comparative static analysis
not included here, we altered the utility function to a constant Frisch labor
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supply elasticity formulation. For the most part, the impact of the produc-
tion function elasticity of substitution on the results of a policy reform were
qualitatively the same as described above. There were some small quantita-
tive differences in the values for the economic variables, but they were mostly
small. The fact that the economic variable outcomes were largely the same,
shows that the assumption about the Frisch labor supply elasticity does not
impact our general conclusion that the production function elasticity of sub-
stitution between the two labor types will be important when the model and
the policy reform under consideration produce a large change in the ratio of
the two labor types.
7 Conclusions
Long lived agent overlapping generations models have shown considerable
ability to offer important insights for a range of fiscal policy reforms. This
ability has led to a greater interest in these models and an expansion in their
modeling foundations. Currently, the modeling frontier is grappling with
how to introduce worker heterogeneity in production beyond the perfectly
elastic substitution case. This paper offers insight into this development by
showing that the outcome of policy reform analysis may be influenced by the
elasticity of substitution across different labor types in production.
Two foundations for labor types were explored over a range of production
elasticities for two types of public policy analysis. It was shown that social
security elimination results can be sensitive to the elasticity of substitution
between more and less experienced labor, while income tax reform results
were less sensitive to this production elasticity no matter what the foundation
for labor productivity are. The reason for the sensitivity under an experience
based labor structure has to do with the impact of the social security reform
on the incentives for providing labor over an agent’s lifetime and therefore on
the relative supply of young labor. Under reforms in which it is attractive for
households to change the relative supply of one type of labor, the results are
sensitive to the production function elasticities which determine the life-cycle
payoffs to labor because of a demand side feedback effect.
Although only a specific social security and a specific income tax reform
were explored, the sensitivity to modeling structure likely applies to other
policy reforms. Any policy reform which provides incentives for agents to
change their life cycle labor profile, will find a greater sensitivity to assump-
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tions about the elasticity of substitution across labor types in the experience
based labor structure because of the demand side feedback effect. Further-
more, we believe these results provide valuable insights to understanding
other models which use different labor foundations altogether. We believe
that as long as the policy reform results in a change in the ratio for the two la-
bor inputs, that values for the elasticity of substitution will have quantitative
implications for a policy reform analysis.
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Table 1a - Common Calibration Details
Parameter Value
Common Parameter Values
J 81 Agents are born when they are 20 and live at most until 100.
 j U.S. life tables, 2003.
jr 45 Agents retire when they are 65 years old.
n 0.011 Average U.S. population growth rate.
 2
 0.36 Share of capital income in U.S. GDP.
A 1 Scaling gure.
g 0.17 Share of government spending in U.S. Data.
 c;t 0.052 Mendoza et al (1994).
0 0.258 Gouveia and Strauss (1994).
1 0.768 Gouveia and Strauss (1994).
 ss;t 0.106 U.S. data
"j Hansen (1983).
Model Specic Parameters
Ability Endowment Labor Structure
p1 0.75 Percentage of the U.S. population with less than college degree.
p2 0.25 p2 = 1  p1
 0.9943 K/Y=3.0
 0.3340 Average hours= 0.33
 0.082 I/Y=0.28
1 0.6966 Variance of log earning at 20 years old = 0.27
2 1.4355 Variance of log earning at 20 years old = 0.27
Experience Based Labor Structure
js 15 Years of experience to become a skilled worker.
 0.9947 K/Y=3.0
 0.3332 Average hours= 0.33
 0.082 I/Y=0.28
1 1.0 Productivity di¤erences already captured by "j .
2 1.0 Productivity di¤erences already captured by "j .
1
Table(s)
Table 1b - Model Specic Parameters
Ability Endowment Labor Structure
B 
 = 0 2 0.5
 = 0:4 1.989 0.533
 = 0:8 1.978 0.566
 = 1:2 1.967 0.599
 = 4 1.900 0.791
Experience Based Labor Structure
 = 0 2 0.5
 = 0:4 1.971 0.446
 = 0:8 1.944 0.393
 = 1:2 1.917 0.343
 = 4:0 1.777 0.102
2
Table 2 - Social Security Reform Results
Ability Endowment Labor Structure
benchmark no social security
 = 0  = 0:4  = 0:8  = 1:2  = 4:0
Output (Y ) 0.76 +25.0% +25.0% +25.0% +24.9% +24.9%
Capital-Output (K=Y ) 3.00 +21.5% +21.5% +21.5% +21.5% +21.5%
Unskilled Labor (L1) 0.24 +14.4% +14.4% +14.4% +14.4% +14.5%
Skilled Labor (L2) 0.17 +8.8% +8.8% +8.8% +8.8% +8.7%
Average hours 0.33 +11.5% +11.5% +11.5% +11.5% +11.6%
Interest rate % (r) 3.8% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7%
Wage rate (w) 1.19 +1.35% +1.35% +1.35% +1.35% +1.36%
CEV (%) +7.3% +7.0% +6.5% +6.1% +2.7%
Experience Based Labor Structure
benchmark no social security
 = 0  = 0:4  = 0:8  = 1:2  = 4:0
Output (Y ) 0.86 +25.5% +26.5% +27.2% +27.7% +29.8%
Capital-Output (K=Y ) 3.00 +21.8% +23.6% +25.0% +26.2% +30.1%
Less Experienced Labor (L1) 0.17 -3.5% -0.7% +1.2% +2.6% +7.0%
More Experienced Labor (L2) 0.29 +21.5% +20.1% +19.0% +18.1% +15.3%
Average hours 0.33 +11.3% +11.5% +11.6% +11.7% +11.8%
Interest rate % (r) 3.8% 1.6% 1.5% 1.4% 1.3% 1.0%
Wage rate (w) 1.19 +11.7% +12.6% +13.4% +14.0% +16.0%
CEV (%) +8.7% +8.4% +8.1% +7.8% +6.8%
3
Table 3 - Proportional Tax Reform Results
Ability Endowment Labor Structure
benchmark proportional taxes
 = 0  = 0:4  = 0:8  = 1:2  = 4:0
Output (Y ) 0.76 +6.17% +6.17% +6.17% +6.17% +6.18%
Capital-Output (K=Y ) 3.00 +2.41% +2.41% +2.41% +2.41% +2.41%
Unskilled Labor (L1) 0.24 +4.9% +4.9% +4.9% +4.9% +4.9%
Skilled Labor (L2) 0.17 +4.6% +4.6% +4.6% +4.6% +4.6%
Average hours 0.33 +4.6% +4.6% +4.6% +4.6% +4.6%
Interest rate % (r) 3.8% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5%
Wage rate (w) 1.19 +1.3% +1.3% +1.3% +1.3% +1.3%
CEV (%) +1.6% +1.6% +1.6% +1.6% +1.5%
Experience Based Labor Structure
benchmark proportional taxes
 = 0  = 0:4  = 0:8  = 1:2  = 4:0
Output (Y ) 0.86 +6.3% +6.3% +6.3% +6.3% +6.4%
Capital-Output (K=Y ) 3.00 +2.0% +2.1% +2.2% +2.2% +2.4%
Less Experienced Labor (L1) 0.17 +3.8% +4.1% +4.3% +4.3% +4.7%
More Experienced Labor (L2) 0.29 +5.8% +5.5% +5.5% +5.4% +5.2%
Average hours 0.33 +5.2% +5.2% +5.2% +5.2% +5.2%
Interest rate % (r) 3.8% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5%
Wage rate (w) 1.19 +1.1% +1.2% +1.2% +1.2% +1.3%
CEV (%) +5.7% +5.7% +5.7% +5.7% +5.8%
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Figure 1b
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Figure 2a
Ability Endowment Labor Structure: Hours Worked by Unskilled Workers
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
age
 benchmark  proportional tax and ρ=0  proportional tax and ρ=4
Ability Endowment Labor Structure: Hours Worked by Skilled Workers
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
age
 benchmark  proportional tax and ρ=0  proportional tax and ρ=4
Figure 2b
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